The 2013 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin case clarified when and how it is legally permissible for universities to use an applicant's race-ethnicity in its admissions decisions. The court concluded that such use is permissible when "no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity." This paper shows that replacing traditional affirmative action with a system that uses an applicant's predicted likelihood of being an underrepresented racial minority as a proxy for the applicant's actual minority status can yield an admitted class that has a lower predicted grade point average and likelihood of graduating than the class that would have been admitted using traditional affirmative action. This result suggests that race-neutral alternatives may not be "workable" from the university's perspective. JEL Codes: I23, I24, J24, H52, K39.
I. INTRODUCTION

I.A. Legal Context
Affirmative Action in college admissions has always been controversial and its legality has been under constant challenge for over 40 years. The 1978 decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the Regents of the University of California v. Bakke case was a split decision. Four justices voted for reversal of the lower court's ruling that the admissions system used by the Medical School at UC-Davis (which reserved a set number of admissions slots for minority applicants) violated the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Federal Civil Rights Act, four voted for affirmance of the lower court ruling, and Justice Powell voted to affirm the part of the decision that stated that UC-Davis's two-track admission system was unconstitutional, but rejected the part that enjoined UC-Davis from taking race into account. Rather, Powell concluded that "the goal of achieving a diverse student body is sufficiently compelling to justify consideration of race in admissions decisions under some circumstances" (p. 267). This ruling prompted "diversity" to be the only compelling argument that most universities could use to justify their use of affirmative action, disallowed the use of separate admissions systems for minority applicants, and limited universities to use race as only one factor among many in comparing applicants. Court's decisions, found that "…diversity is a compelling interest in higher education, and that race is one of a number of factors that can be taken into account to achieve the educational benefits of a diverse student body. The Court found that the individualized, whole-file review used in the University of Michigan Law School's admissions process is narrowly tailored to achieve the educational benefits of diversity… while race is one of a number of factors that can be considered in undergraduate admissions, the automatic distribution of [a fixed number of points] to students from underrepresented minority groups is not narrowly tailored" (p.
1, Alger, 2003) .
These decisions essentially allowed for race and ethnicity to be taken account of in admissions, so long as that consideration was not mechanical and was part of a full review of the applicant's file.
Furthermore, the Grutter decision outlined steps that universities must take prior to using race/ethnicity in their admission decisions. Justice O'Connor's Opinion of the Court noted that: Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative. Nor does it require a university to choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all racial groups. … Narrow tailoring does, however, require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks" (p. 27).
Finally, the Grutter decision concluded that "race conscious admissions policies must be limited in time" (p. 30) and included O'Connor's note that:
"It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public higher education. … We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today" (p. 31).
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To some critics of affirmative action, this stated expectation appeared to establish an expiration date for affirmative action, and created an invitation to continue to legally challenge university policies.
Following the Grutter decision, the University of Texas at Austin (UT) announced their return to using affirmative action in 2005 (Faulkner, 2005 Krueger, Rothstein, and Turner (2006) concluded that this expectation is too optimistic; "Economic progress alone is unlikely to narrow the achievement gap enough in 25 years to produce today's racial diversity levels with race-blind admissions" (p. 282). For a sample of other recent empirical analyses of affirmative action in college admissions, see Holzer and Neumark (2000, 2006) , Long (2004) , Arcidiacono (2005) , Howell (2010), and Hinrichs (2012 (Fisher, 2013a, p. 1) . In remanding the case, they ruled that "the Fifth Circuit must assess whether the University has offered sufficient evidence to prove that its admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity" (Fisher, 2013a, p. 3) .
"University must prove [to the reviewing court] that the means it chose to attain that diversity are narrowly tailored to its goal. On this point, the University receives no deference….The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity" (Fisher, 2013b, p. 10) [emphasis added].
The Fisher decision, which surprised many who expected a more conservative set of justices to overturn the Grutter decision and strike down affirmative action in admissions, has yielded a greater degree of legal stability. However, the term "workable" remains vague.
Workable seems to mean that the race-neutral alternative would not have too great of an adverse effect on other university objectives (such as in maintaining the "quality" of its admitted students). If challenged, a university would need to convince a court that race-neutral alternatives are not workable because the costs of such policies would be too great. The Supreme Court's decisions are likewise vague regarding what "race-neutral" means. The
Grutter decision obliquely makes the following reference: "Universities in California, Florida, and Washington State, where racial preferences in admissions are prohibited by state law, are currently engaged in experimenting with a wide variety of alternative approaches. Universities in other States can and should draw on the most promising aspects of these race-neutral alternatives as they develop" (p. 31).
A more cogent discussion of legal "race-neutral" alternatives can be found in Coleman, Palmer, and Winnick (2008) , who conclude that "facially race-neutral policies are subject to strict scrutiny (and qualify as legally 'race-conscious') only if they are motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose and result in a racially discriminatory effect" (p. 5). They caution universities that their policies may be deemed "race-conscious" if the policy "would not have been promulgated but for the motivation for achieving segregation or racial impact", "race is the predominant motivating factor behind the policy", or "there is a deliberate use of race-neutral criteria as a proxy for race" (p. 5). It would therefore seem that any policy that attempted to give weight in admissions decisions to any other factors aside from race (e.g., socioeconomic status) with the goal of boosting minority admissions would be deemed to be not "race-neutral" and would instead be deemed "race-conscious" and face the strict scrutiny test. Thus, there is an inherent tension in the terms "race-neutral" and "alternative" -if one seeks an "alternative" policy to race-based affirmative action that serves the same goal, then such a policy cannot be deemed "race-neutral." As an example, after the Hopwood decision, the Texas Legislature passed H.B. 588, which gave state institutions a list of 18 socioeconomic indicators that they could use in making first-time freshman admissions decisions. To the extent that the use of such indicators was intended to serve the purpose of replacing race-based affirmative action, such use would not be "race-neutral." This tension was recognized in Justice Ginsburg's dissent in the Fisher case: "I have said before and reiterate here that only an ostrich could regard the supposedly neutral alternatives as race unconscious… As Justice Souter observed, the vaunted alternatives suffer from 'the disadvantage of deliberate obfuscation'" (Fisher, 2013c, p. 2).
I.B. Research Questions
This paper evaluates the effects of replacing "traditional affirmative action" (which places direct weight on the applicant's race/ethnicity in the university's admissions decision) with "proxy-based affirmative action" (which places weight on the applicant's predicted likelihood of being an underrepresented minority). Nakedly and deliberately engaging in such "proxy-based affirmative action" would not qualify as a "race-neutral alternative." Yet, such a direct alternate policy yields the upper-bound impact for other less transparent alternative policies, such as giving added weight to socioeconomic status or utilizing de facto high school segregation to help boost minority admissions by admitting all students who graduate in the top-X% of their high school classes.
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Using administrative admissions data from the University of Texas at Austin, I answer the following research questions. First, if UT used all of the information that they had obtained on an applicant (aside from the student's race) to predict the student's race and then used proxybased affirmative action rather than traditional affirmative action, what effects would that policy change yield in terms of the academic qualities of the admitted student body? Second what share of minority and non-minority students would be "displaced" (i.e., admitted under one regime but not the other) when using the proxy-based system rather than race-based affirmative action?
2 Another race-neutral alternative would be for universities to attempt to boost minority application rates by, for example, doing more recruiting visits to high schools with large minority enrollments. The theoretical potential for such an application-based strategy to be efficacious is established in Brown and Hirschman (2006) . Yet, there is scant empirical evidence to document the effectiveness of such recruiting strategies, and there are inferences that such alternative strategies have been ineffective (Long, 2007) . This paper builds off the theoretical work of Chan and Eyster (2003) who predicted that universities would respond to affirmative action bans by shifting the weights placed on applicant characteristics in ways to favor minority applicants, and the empirical work of Long and Tienda (2008) , who used the same administrative data and found "some evidence that universities changed the weights they placed on applicant characteristics in ways that aided underrepresented minority applicants…these changes were insufficient to restore Black and Hispanic applicants' share of admitted students" (p. 255). That is, while UT and Texas A&M University did respond to the Hopwood decision by implicitly using correlated indicators for race, their efforts were not sufficient to restore the racial composition of the admitted students. Long and Tienda focused on actual changes enacted by UT, Texas A&M, and Texas Tech University in the years following the Hopwood decision. In contrast, this paper estimates hypothetical changes that UT could have taken so as to evaluate the implications of fully restoring minority representation using correlated indicators of the student's race/ethnicity.
As shown below, I find that UT had limited ability to predict a student's race-ethnicity just based on the information it collected on applicants during these years. Consequently, if they sought to restore the representation of these minority groups, they would need to place more weight on the applicant's predicted likelihood of being an underrepresented minority than they previously placed directly on the applicant's minority status. Doing so, however, comes at the cost of yielding an admitted class that has a lower predicted grade point average and likelihood of graduating than the class that would have been admitted using traditional affirmative action.
This result suggests that race-neutral alternatives may not be "workable" from the university's perspective.
II. METHODS
I begin by estimating the parameters of UT's "Traditional Race-Based Affirmative Action" admissions system. I estimate the following probit regression using data on UT's applicants in 1996, which was the last year in which UT could use race-based affirmative action prior to enforcement of the Hopwood ruling:
URM i equals one if the student is an "underrepresented minority", which is inclusive of Black, Hispanic, and American Indian/Alaskan Native students 3 , and X is a vector of other characteristics that the university considers in their admissions decision.
In the remainder of the analysis, I utilize data on UT's applicants in 1998, 1999, and 2000 . Using these data, I evaluate the efficacy of alternative policies in the years immediately following the Hopwood decision.
As salient measures of the educational quality and desirability of each applicant, I
estimate the cumulative grade point average (GPA) and likelihood of graduating within 6 years 4 3 Affirmative action practices at colleges and universities in the United States have historically not given preference to Asian American students (Bowen & Bok, 1998) . Long (2004) and Long and Tienda (2008) found no significant advantage or disadvantage given to Asian applicants relative to White applicants using, respectively, national college admissions data from 1992 and institutional admissions data from the UT in pre-Hopwood years. As the data I use only record race as "Asian," I cannot determine any greater level of racial or ethnic specificity beyond this category.
using data on students who enrolled at UT in 1998, as shown in Equation 2a and 2b (which uses j subscripts to denote enrollees) 5 :
Z includes characteristics that are observable to the university for its applicants. 6 Equation 2a is estimated using a tobit specification with lower and upper bounds of 0.0 and 4.0, respectively. I assume that these parameters, which are estimated based on enrollees, would roughly hold for all applicants, and apply the resulting coefficients to estimate the applicant's "Quality" from the perspective of the university:
where
Next, using data from 1998-2000 applicants, I estimate the probability that the applicant is an underrepresented minority based on observable applicant characteristics using the probit regression shown in Equation 4:
I then compute the probability that applicant i is an underrepresented minority, which is subsequently used as the proxy indicator for the student's race:
Finally, I simulate the racial composition and Quality of admitted students under three admissions systems as follows 7 :
(6a) "Traditional Race-Based Affirmative Action":
"Passive Affirmative Action Ban":
(6c) "Proxy-Based Affirmative Action":
The beta parameters in Equations 6a-6c are derived from the estimation of Equation 1. Equation 6a is used to simulate the class that UT would have admitted had they maintained their preHopwood admission system. The second admission system, which I label "Passive Affirmative Action Ban", holds the weights on X characteristics constant at ̂2 , yet sets the weight on URM ( ̂1 ) to zero. The idea here is that the university accommodates the affirmative action ban, but 7 v i is a random variable which (consistent with a probit model) is distributed N(0,1). Since a random variable is included in the computation of the student's AdmissionIndex, I repeat the simulation ten times and report the mean of the ten simulations.
makes no other changes to its admissions formula in order to boost minority enrollment. The third admission system, which I label "Proxy-Based Affirmative Action", gives positive weight to the likelihood that the student is an underrepresented minority in the university's admissions decisions. By slowly increasing the value of θ in Equation 6c, I demonstrate how (a) using a proxy can increase minority representation among the admitted class, and (b) how doing so has distortionary effects on the set of admitted students and potentially has impacts on the academic quality of the admitted set. For these simulations, I assume that UT would sort applicants based on their AdmissionsIndex scores and admit the top-N applicants, where N is actual number of students who were admitted during these three years.
III. DATA
Administrative data for the analysis was compiled by the Texas Higher Education Opportunity Project at Princeton University (http://opr.princeton.edu/archive/theop). Table I contains the descriptive statistics. The online appendix contains additional information on the variables and their construction. Since some variables are missing in the applicant files (most notably for parent's education in 1996), I use multiple imputation by chained equations, creating five imputed datasets, and combine the results using Rubin's (1987) method.
[Insert Table I here] IV. RESULTS
IV.A. Regression Results
Column 1 of Table II contains the parameter estimates reflecting UT's pre-Hopwood admission system (i.e., Equation 1). Consistent with prior research, underrepresented minorities are substantially more likely to be admitted than observably similar non-URMs. The average marginal effect of being a URM on the likelihood of admittance is 15.9 percentage points. The university also gave positive (but declining) weight to students with higher SAT/ACT test scores, and was more likely to admit students who took and scored 3 or higher on Advanced Placement (AP) exams and who are from Texas and are U.S. citizens. Notably, there is no evidence that UT attempted to use socioeconomic characteristics in their pre-Hopwood admissions decisions as there was no significant weight placed on parent's highest education level or the characteristics of the high schools the student attended.
[Insert Table II here] Columns 2 and 3 of Table II contains the parameter estimates for Equations 2a and 2b, which show the relationship of student characteristics to future academic success.
Underrepresented minority and Asian American enrollees had lower cumulative GPAs than their white counterparts, but there were no significant racial differences in 6-year graduation rates.
Test scores and high school class rank were both positively associated with likelihood of graduation (in their relevant ranges), and class rank (but not test scores) was positively associated with cumulative GPA. Taking and "passing" AP exams were positively associated with both collegiate success measures. Female students, non-U.S. citizens, those who graduated from a UT "feeder" high school, had a parent with a graduate degree, and whose parents' income was over $80,000 earned higher college GPAs and were more likely to graduate. Finally, students from Texas earned lower GPAs, but were more likely to gradate from UT. When these coefficients are applied to all applicants in the years 1998-2000 using Equations 3a and 3b, the predicted cumulative GPA has a mean (s. lower education and lower income. All of these factors are positively associated with future academic success (as shown in columns 2 and 3). Thus, as the university places more weight on any of these factors in an effort to boost minority admissions, they will obtain an admitted class with lower "quality". Table III shows the extent to which alternative admissions policies displace students from the available slots. Starting with the middle panel, among the URM students who are admitted using the traditional race-based affirmative action admissions policy, only 83% are admitted under the passive affirmative action ban system (i.e., 17% are "displaced" by the ban). Moving to a proxy-based system would only somewhat offset this displacement. Even when the weight placed on the Proxy i in Equation 6c (i.e. θ) is 3.5 (which is more than 4 times as large as the estimated coefficient on URM i in Equation 6a), there are still 9% of those who would be admitted under traditional affirmative action admissions policy who are not admitted. Moreover, among URMs who are not admitted under the traditional affirmative action admissions policy, 23% would be admitted under the proxy-based system when θ = 3.5. Thus, the proxy system leads to admission of lower-"quality" URMs. Finally, as seen in the last two rows of Table III, the proxy-based affirmative action policy brings in non-URMs who would not be admitted under either the traditional affirmative action or passive ban systems. These rows reveal an inefficiency in the proxy-based system as these newly admitted non-URMs are only admitted in order to improve URMs' share of admitted students.
IV.B. Simulation Results
[Insert Table III here] Table IV shows the effect of the alternate admission systems on the composition and quality of the admitted students. Moving from traditional affirmative action to a passive affirmative action ban system lowers URMs' share of admitted students from 19.5% to 16.1%.
If the university wanted to restore this URM share using the proxy system, they would need to set θ = 3.5. As the next two rows show, doing so comes as the cost of lowering student quality.
First note that implementing the banning affirmative action only mildly raises quality, increasing average predicted GPAs from 2.944 to 2.952 and predicted likelihood of graduating from UT within 6 years from 74.5% to 74.7%. Subsequently implementing a proxy-based affirmative action system completely undoes this improvement. If such a proxy-based system were implemented such as to fully restore URMs' share, it would lower average predicted GPAs down to 2.922 and predicted likelihood of graduating from UT within 6 years down to 73.7%. Figure I graphically shows the effects of the proxy system on graduation rates. To put these changes in perspective, moving from the passive affirmative action ban system to the fully-implemented proxy-based system would lower the average admitted student from the 61 st to 59 th percentile of the distribution of applicants based on predicted cumulative GPA, and from 57 th to 55 th percentile based on predicted likelihood of graduating from UT within 6 years. Or, for every 10,000 enrollees, UT should expect nearly 100 fewer graduates. And, among all 4-year institutions nationally, UT's 6-year graduation rate would fall from the 88 th to 87 th percentile.
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[Insert Table IV here] [Insert Figure I here]
V. CONCLUSION
The Grutter and Fisher decisions have created a clear mandate that universities must first
show that "workable race-neutral" alternatives are insufficient to produce the benefits of having a diverse class of enrollees before these universities are permitted to use race-based affirmative action. All alternative admission systems that attempt to boost minority enrollment by giving weight to other non-race applicant characteristics that are correlated with race (e.g., systems that
give advantage to lower socioeconomic status applicants for this purpose) are in essence attempts to create "proxies" for minority status. In this paper, I investigate what would happen if a university directly gave weight to the applicant's predicted likelihood of being an underrepresented minority applicant (rather than placing arbitrary weights on correlated indicators). I show that while such a system can be used to restore minority's share of admitted students, doing so can result in a class that has modestly lower predicted likelihood of collegiate academic success. Furthermore, utilizing such a proxy-based admission system is inefficient; in the simulation, I find that it required the university to place over four times as much weight on predicted minority status as the weight it previously placed directly on actual minority status, resulting in non-minority applicants being admitted who would not have been otherwise admitted.
If a university attempted to utilize a proxy-based admission system, they would encounter a variety of dilemmas. First, to reduce the inefficiencies discussed above, they may be tempted to seek out additional information that is correlated with minority status. In a report I was commissioned to produce for the Educational Testing Service (Long, Forthcoming) was able to correctly predict underrepresented minority status for 82% of the students. The top-3 most predictive characteristics were the minority status of the student's 1 st , 2 nd , and 3 rd best friends -such information would be difficult for a university to reliably obtain. I note that "(w)hile the universities may want to go down this path, they may be thwarted by the monetary cost of purchasing such information, the political challenge that would be likely to follow from such privacy invasion, and the distaste it would engender in applicants" (p. 8). Furthermore, a naked and direct use of racial proxies is sure to invite legal challenge as such a policy would not be deemed "race neutral" as discussed in the introduction. On the other hand, the use of less direct proxy systems (such as arbitrary weighting of correlated indicators) is likely to produce even more inefficiency, distorting the set of admitted students, and further lowering academic quality. The second challenge universities would face is the extent to which they attempted to restore minority students' share of admitted students via the proxy-based system. If they sought to exactly offset the decline in minority students' share of admitted students brought about by the elimination of traditional race-based affirmative action (as was done in the simulation in this paper), they could be deemed guilty of having a quota for minority students, which would violate the Bakke decision. A lower-court ruling which went against the University of Michigan Law
School in the Grutter case cited the university's target of 10-12% minority students as unconstitutional; "by using race to ensure the enrollment of a certain minimum percentage of underrepresented minority students, the law school has made the current admissions policy practically indistinguishable from a quota system" (Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 851
Setting aside these challenges, whether such alternative admissions systems are "workable" is in the eye of the beholder. I find that a proxy-based system (using the information currently available to universities) would modestly lower the predicted collegiate success of admitted students. In the simulation in this paper, the admitted students' predicted GPAs are found to fall from 2.95 to 2.92, and predicted likelihood of graduating from 74.7% to 73.7%.
Whether this is a large enough cost to the university to be deemed not "workable" is unclear, and would likely vary from university-to-university and court-to-court.
(1) 
Notes: ***, **, and * reflect two-sided p-values that are, respectively, equal to or less than 1%, 5%, and 10%. Robust statndard errors clustered at the high school level are used. For the four variables that are squared, the listed "average marginal effect" does not take into account the issues with evaluating interaction terms in non-linear models as discussed by Ai and Norton (2003) , but rather simply shows the average of 
